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Multiple Realizability
Putnam argued against the type-identity theory in these papers. He believed that although systems can be structurally similar, that does not determine how the will respond. For example, someone experiencing the pain of grief may feel certain physical symptoms of pain that are not felt by another person experiencing the same. Putnam, Hilary, 1967, “Psychological Predicates”, in W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. -
Machine State Functionalism
In the Philosophy and Our Mental Life (1975), Putnam compares mental states to the functions of a mathematical Turing machine. The products or accomplishments of a mental state are less important than the inputs and outputs contributed to and by that state. Bickle, John, "Multiple Realizability", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/multiple-realizability/. -
Machine State Functionalism Continued
For example, you see an accident on the highway that makes you cry. The input is seeing the accident and output would be crying. Each person would respond differently to this so your normal mental state is probably very empathetic so the input caused this cry response. -
Theory of Meaning
Putnam contributed to the idea of casual theory of reference in The Meaning of Meanings (1975). It is stated that the meaning that we attribute to certain objects or organisms is encompassed by a series of vectors from either a knowledge base or from experience. These vectors can cause stereotypes that give the meaning of something certain attributes that every individual might not think of. -
Theory of Meaning Continued
Let’s use snakes for example. Many Christians fear snakes by associating them with the devil, evil, and viciousness. However, biologists know that snakes are very timid and territorial and mostly just want to be left alone and not seek out a victim. Putnam, Hilary. (1975). The Meaning of "Meaning". University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/185225. -
Semantic Externalism
Putnam contributed to the philosophy of language by using an example of twin earths. If we found another identical planet, H20 may actually be XYZ and the “sky” might actually be the “ground”. With this he suggests that meaning cannot be contributed from knowledge since we determine meaning personally by subjective experience. Putnam, Hilary. (1981): "Brains in a vat" in Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press. -
