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Hans Reichenbach requested Hempel to spend a fall semester at the University of Vienna to study with himself, Moritz Schlick, Frederick Waismann and Rudolf Carnap, to discuss his philosophy of science. They were all part of the logical positivism movement, which they were also known as the "circle of Vienna". One paper was created in 1945 called The Studies of Logic of Confirmation which Hempel looked at the difference between evidence and hypothesis.
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Hempel, Carl G. and Paul Oppenheim, 1945, “A Definition of ‘Degree of Confirmation’”, Philosophy of Science https://youtu.be/_SKmqh5Eu4Y
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Carl Hempel moved to Brussels and began collaborating with Paul Oppenheim, which would result in a classical paper, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, which appeared in 1948. In which it would try to explain the better way to come to a conclusion of the question “why” rather than the "what". Hempel observed that universal generalizations of the form, “(x)(Fx⊃ Gx)”, are true if and only if logically equivalent generalizations of the form, “(x)(¬Fx∨Gx)”, are true.
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Hempel, Carl G. and Oppenheim, Paul (1948) “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” In Brody
1948, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 15(2): 135–175. https://youtu.be/WmpEqZQ60n8 -
Hempel worked closely together with Thomas Kuhn at a colleague at Princeton, in which Hempel contributed to both the formation and the decline of logical positivism. He says that a cognitive statement is an empiricist idea and is in the total of its logical answer to all other statements in that question and not just to the observation sentences.
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1950 "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," 11 Revue International de Philosophie
1988, "Provisoes: a problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories." Erkenntnis 28
1972 Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. Chicago: Universiy of Chicago Press -
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Hempel goes back and criticizes logical positivism’s theory of science about the difference between observational and theoretical terms with the problem. Hempel says that the meaning of theoretical terms can be explained by means of linguistic methods. and he uses Schlick’s method to say that it is not tenable. He also used Newton's to say it cannot determine the position of the planets because it only deals in gravity.
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1973 "The Meaning of Theoretical Terms: A Critique to the Standard Empiricist Construal," in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science IV 1988, "Provisoes: a problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories." Erkenntnis 28